

A quantum experiment with joint exogeneity violation

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Joint work with Dr. Xingjian Zhang from University of Hong Kong



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Based on joint work with



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Acknowledgement

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Tsinghua University




Howard Wiseman
Griffith University

Statistician:



Linbo Wang
University of Toronto



Thomas Richardson
U. of Washington

Causal inference 101

- Randomized experiment: gold standard of causal inference;

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There are two types of exogeneity assumption in the literature:



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- **marginal exogeneity**: $Y(z) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$ for $z \in \{0, 1\}$;
- **joint exogeneity**: $(Y(1), Y(0)) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$.

Comparison between two assumptions

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Talk overview

- We provide an example where assuming **joint exogeneity** of a fully randomized assignment results in a **contradiction** with other basic principles of causal models;


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
- We provide an example where assuming **joint exogeneity** of a fully randomized assignment results in a **contradiction** with other basic principles of causal models;
- We further discuss philosophical insights / open questions from this violation.

Experiment: a randomized experiment with noncompliance




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
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
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\Rightarrow **Ex**: adjusting the angle of **polarizer** based on the outputs.

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Then $\mathcal{I}_Q := -\langle Y \rangle_1 + 2\langle Y \rangle_2 + \langle X \rangle_1 - \langle XY \rangle_1 + 2\langle XY \rangle_3 \leq 3$, where

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This results in a **contradiction**:

- Chaves et al. (Nat. Phys. '18): there exists a quantum system constructed **according to** the IV graph s.t. $\mathcal{I}_Q > 3$.
 \Rightarrow It can be $\mathcal{I}_Q = 1 + 2\sqrt{2}$.

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 - Consistency
 - Intervention representability.

Minimal requirements of P.O. existence

- Consistency: $Y = \sum_{z \in \{1,2,3\}} \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{1}\{X = x, Z = z\} Y(x, z);$

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Follows from exactly the same logic as def. of ATT / ATC:


- $\mathbb{E}[Y(1) \mid T = 1] - \mathbb{E}[Y(0) \mid T = 1];$
- or more generally: $\mathbb{E}[Y(t) \mid T = t'].$

ATT / ATC definition

Following **same logic** as ATT's def., $\mathbb{P}(Y(x, z) = y \mid X, Z)$


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


$$\mathbb{P}(Y(x, z) = y, X = x' \mid Z = z') = \text{tr}[(M_{x'}^{z'} \otimes N_y^x)\rho]$$

- $M_x^z, N_y^x \in \mathbb{H}^{2 \times 2}$: specification of how the photons sent to $X \& Y$ are **measured**;
- $\rho \in \mathbb{H}^{4 \times 4}$: **state** of two entangled photons.

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$$\mathbb{P}(Y(x, \mathbf{z}_1) = y \mid X = x', Z = z') = \mathbb{P}(Y(x, \mathbf{z}_2) = y \mid X = x', Z = z') \\ (\text{stratified exclusion restriction}).$$

Problem transferred to: giving an upper bound of \mathcal{I}_Q under stratified exclusion restriction & joint exogeneity;

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Proved that $\mathcal{I}_Q \leq 3$.

Assumption summary

Assumption 1

There exists random variables $Y(0, 1), \dots, Y(1, 3)$ with

- (i) Consistency;
- (ii) Intervention representability.

Assumption 2

Joint exogeneity

$$Z \perp\!\!\!\perp (Y(0, 1), \dots, Y(1, 3)).$$

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Joint exogeneity

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Consistency seems to be a fundamental assumption, so more likely:

joint exogeneity & intervention representability

cannot co-exist.

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- So it's **more likely** that J.E. is violated.

Discussions & Open questions

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\Rightarrow a **counterfactual distribution**;


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\Rightarrow a **counterfactual distribution**;

- Not a “legal distribution” allowed by SWIG framework:



\Rightarrow we can only define $\mathbb{P}(Y(x, z) = y \mid \textcolor{red}{X} = x', \textcolor{blue}{Z} = z)$

Open question



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


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- **If not**, does that mean P.O.s **cannot** model all ATT/ATC like queries?


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- **Q:** since we don't assume “locality”, why contradiction still exists?



Discussion with quantum phycists / quantum logician



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⇒ Different from Robins et al. (15), Gill (14): locality is not required if we just want to define P.O.s.

Thank you for your attention!

Previous version (may be substantially revised based on feedbacks from open questions):

Wang, Y., & Zhang, X. (2025). *“A quantum experiment with joint exogeneity violation.”* arXiv:2507.22747